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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
i. Nature of the Case 
This case concerns the interpretation of a single provision of an insurance policy. 
The plaintiffs/appellants Brian and Glenda Am1strong (hereinafter "the Armstrongs") 
purchased a homeowner's policy (hereinafter "the Policy") from the defendant/respondent 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (hereinafter "Farmers"). The home which the 
Armstrongs insured under the Policy was damaged when their backyard swimming pool 
suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed. The collapse caused thousands of gallons of water, 
mud and debris to flow into their finished basement damaging the residence and personal 
property in it. Armstrongs tendered a claim under the Policy but Farmers denied coverage. 
The Armstrongs contend that their Policy provides for coverage for the loss caused by this 
occurance. The Armstrongs sued Farmers to enforce coverage. 
The Armstrongs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment arguing that the Policy 
provides coverage for their loss under a provision covering damages occasioned by the 
sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water from a household appliance. 1 On the 
Armstongs' motion, the District Court appears to have attempted to interpret the entire 
Policy, not just the "household appliance" provision. The Court ultimately concluded that 
the Armstrongs were not covered for their claimed loss because the Policy definition of 
1 This provision in the Policy will be referenced as the "household appliance" provision throughout this brief for 
ease of reference. 
"water damage" includes loss caused by overflow or escape of water from a "body of water," 
which according to the District Court, would include a swimming pool. 
The Armstrongs contend that their swimming pool collapse was covered under the 
household appliance provision. Alternatively, the Armstrongs argue the loss could be 
covered under other provisions of the Policy that they did not address below. In either case, 
the Armstrong's contend the District Court's ruling below was in error. 
ii. Course of the Proceedings Below 
The Armstrongs filed a Complaint against Farmers on December 23, 2003. R. p. 1. 
In their Complaint the Armstrongs alleged breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, negligence, unfair trade practices and constructive fraud. R. pp. 2-8. 
On or about March 19, 2004 Farmers answered the Complaint generally denying the 
Armstrongs' allegations. R. pp. 13-20. Discovery ensued. On January 5, 2005 the 
Armstrongs moved for partial summary judgment on the narrow issue of whether the Policy 
provided for coverage for the damages to the Annstrongs' real and personal property caused 
by the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Armstrongs' above-ground swimming pool. R. 
p. 79. 2 Specifically, Armstrongs asked the court to interpret the household appliance 
provision of the Policy. R. p. 82. 
2 The Armstrong's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed on 
January 5, 2005. The Annstrongs inadvertently forgot to file the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at the same 
time as the Memorandum. The Armstrongs filed a Motion to Shorten Time and the Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on January 20, 2005. 
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On February 1, 2005 the District Court for the First District of the State of Idaho 
heard the Arrnstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Tr. p. 2 (2007). On March 
21, 2005, the District Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Partial 
Summary Judgment. In its Opinion and Order, the District Court addressed not just the 
household appliance provision of the Policy, argued by the Armstrongs, but other provisions 
of the Policy as well. It ruled broadly that Farmers was not obligated to cover the 
Am1Strongs' losses under any part of the Policy or under any other theory. R. p. 180. 
On February 2, 2007 Farmers filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment R. p. 187. 
Farmers asked the District Court to dismiss the Arrnstrongs claims based on the District 
Court's previous ruling that Armstrongs were not covered under the Policy for the losses 
claimed. R. p. 191. On March 27, 2007, the Court heard oral argument on Farmers' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Tr. p. 2, ll. 1-3 (2007). The District Court stated that it could have 
entered summary judgment for Farmers on Arrnstrongs' Motion for Partial Smmnary 
Judgment but elected not to do so. Tr. p. 5, ll. 2-12 (2007). Then, on April 16, 2007 the 
District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Farmers. R. pp. 195-196. The 
Annstrongs now bring this appeal of the issues stated below. 
iii. Concise Statement of Relevant Facts 
The Arrnstrongs purchased "Protector Plus" homeowner's insurance (policy number 
91828-0327) from Farmer's agent David Nipp for their residence. The Policy's coverage 
period was from March 24, 2003 to March 23, 2004. R. p. 47. At the time the Armstrongs 
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purchased the Policy they discussed the Policy coverage with agent Nipp. R. p. 77, ll. 2-16. 
The Armstrong's informed Nipp that they had an above-ground swimming pool and inquired 
whether they would be covered for the swimming pool. Id; R. p. 71, ll. 9-16. Armstrongs 
contend that Nipp told them that they would be covered for the pool under the Policy. R. p. 
72, ll. 3-5. Nipp denies that this conversation took place. Augmented/Corrected Record. A.ff. 
Nipp. 3 
On July 2, 2003, (within the coverage period of the Policy) the Armstrongs returned 
home to find that their above-ground swimming pool had collapsed. The water in it flooded 
into their finished basement together with mud and debris. R. pp. 73-74, ll. 19-20. The 
release of water from the pool caused damage to both the Arrnstrongs' dwelling and its 
contents. R. p. 75, ll. 8-12. The pool was connected to the house through means of an 
extension cord to the filtration pump, but not by any piping or plumbing. R. p. 156, !!. 3-5. 
Armstrongs immediately notified Farmers of the loss. R. pp. 73-74. On September 
17, 2003, Farmers wrote to the Arrnstrongs denying coverage. On October 2, 2003, Farmers 
again wrote to the Armstrongs denying coverage for the loss. On October 24, 2003, the 
Armstrongs prepared and submitted a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss to comply with 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and the Policy. R. pp. 44-68. By letter dated November 14, 2003, 
3 The Annstrongs filed a separate lawsuit against the insurance agent David Nipp alleging negligence, breach of 
duty, failure to procure coverage and misrepresentation. That suit is being held abeyance pending the disposition of 
this case. The factual dispute concerning statements by Nipp to the Armstrongs were not considered by the District 
Court on the Armstongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in this action. 
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Fanners again informed the Armstrongs that it was denying their claim. R. p. 69. The 
Annstrongs filed suit in District Court, Kootenai County on December 23, 2003. R. p. 001. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
L Whether the District Court erred in denying A1111strongs' Motion for Partial 
Sununary Judgment holding that Fanners was not obligated to compensate the 
Annstrongs for their alleged loss to their dwelling and personal property. 
(i) Did the sudden, unexpected escape of water from the Armstrongs' pool 
constitute "water damage" for which coverage is excluded? 
(ii) Did the District Court err in its analysis of what constitutes a 
"household appliance" under the Policy? 
II. Whether the District Court erred in effectively granting summary judgment to 
the non-moving party (Farmers) on an issue that was not raised or addressed 
by the moving party (Armstrongs). 
(i) Did the District Court's ruling on summary judgment impermissibly 
disregard other portions of the Policy under which coverage could be 
required? 
(ii) Did the District Court's ruling on summary judgment impermissibly 
disregard evidence that an oral binder of coverage took place? 
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ARGUMENT 
A complete copy of the Policy is found in the Record at 025-041 and as submitted by 
Appellants with their Motion to Augment/Correct the Record. See, FtNt 5 infra, p. 7. The 
specific portions of the Policy addressed in Armstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and are as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
*** 
18. Water - means water (H20) alone, whether frozen or not or any liquid 
or sludge which contains water, whether or not combined with other 
chemicals or impurities. 
19. Water Damage - means loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to 
or aggravated by any of the following, whether occurring on or away 
from the residence premises: 
a. Water from rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal 
water, overflow or escape of a body of water, or spray from 
any of these, whether or not driven by wind; 
b. Water which backs up through sewers or drains; 
c. Water which escapes from any system designed to drain water 
away ... ; 
d. Water below ground level whether occurring naturally or not, 
including water which ... seeps or leaks through a building ... 
swimming pool or ... the residence premises. 
SECTION 1 - PROPERTY 
LOSSES INSURED 
Coverage A - Dwelling 
*** 
*** 
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Coverage B - Separate Structures 
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in Coverage 
A and B, except as provided in Section I- Losses Not Insured. 
Coverage C - Personal Property 
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in Coverage 
C, but only if caused by one or more of the following perils: 
*** 
13. Sudden and accidental discharge or overflow of water or steam from 
within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system, or from within a 
household appliance, but not for deterioration, rust, mold, wet or dry rot 
due to the presence of water over a period oftime.4 
* * * 
SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED 
Applying to Coverage A and B - Dwelling and Separate Structures and 
Coverage C - Personal Property 
We do not insure for loss either consisting of, or caused directly or indirectly 
by: 
l. Earth Movement. 
*** 
2. Water damage. 5 
Acts or omissions of persons can cause, contribute to or aggravate 
water damage. Also water damage can occur naturally to cause loss 
or combine with acts or omissions of persons to cause loss. Whenever 
4 Paragraph 13 is the Policy section referenced in this brief as the "household appliance" provision. 
5 This section of the Policy addressing losses not insured (2. Water damage) is the replacement language provided 
by "Endorsement H6104 l" Edition" located on the very last page of the Policy. Due to a Clerk's error, their 
endorsement was omitted from the Record on Appeal. See, Motion to Augment/Correct the Clerk's Record. 
The replaced portion of the Policy read: 
2. Water damage. Acts or omissions of persons can cause, contribute or aggravate water damage 
... the resulting loss is always excluded under this policy, however caused; except we do cover 
direct loss to the dwelling ... or personal property if caused by fire or explosion resulting from 
water damage. 
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water damage occurs, the resulting loss is always excluded under this 
policy, however caused; except we do cover: 
*** 
1. . .. water damage resulting from build-up of ice on ... the 
roof or roof gutters. 
2. loss or damage to the interior of any dwelling .... , or to 
personal property inside the dwelling . . . caused by water 
damage, if the dwelling first sustain loss or damage caused by a 
peril described under Section I. Losses Insured - Coverage C. 
[ underscoring addeaj 
*** 
4. Faulty, inadequate or defective planning, zoning, development, 
13. 
surveying, siting, design, specifications, workmanship, 
construction, grading, compaction, maintenance repair 
materials, construction, remodeling or maintenance of part or all 
of any property (including land, structures or any 
improvements) whether on or off the residence premises. 
However, we do cover ensuing loss by fire, explosion or sudden 
and accidental discharge of water . ... 
a. 
b. 
* * * 
wear and tear, marring, deterioration; 
mechanical breakdown; 
*** 
g. settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, or expansion of 
pavements, patios, foundations, walls, floors, roofs or 
ceilings. 
*** 
If any of the perils listed in a i above cause water to escape 
suddenly and accidentally from a plumbing, heating, or air 
conditioning system or household appliance, we cover loss not 
otherwise excluded to the dwelling or separate structure caused 
by water ... We do not cover the system or appliance from 
which the water or steam escaped. [underscore addeaj 
R. pp. 26-42, as Augmented/Corrected. 
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The District Court erred when it decided that the household appliance provision 
in the Policy did not apply to the Armstrongs claimed losses. 
The rules of interpretation of contracts, particularly contracts of insurance, are well 
settled. Insurance policies are a matter of contract between the insurer and the insured. 
Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 352, 766 P.2d 1227, 1233 (1988). In the absence 
of ambiguity, an insurance policy must be construed as any other contract and understood in 
its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording 
of the contract. Juker v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792, 793 
(1981); Bonner County v. Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 101 Idaho 772, 776, 620 P.2d 1102, 
1106 (1980). However, if there is an ambiguity, special rules of construction apply to 
insurance contracts to protect the insured. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 509, 
600 P.2d 1387, 1391 (1979). One of these special rules requires that insurance policies are to 
be construed most liberally in favor of recovery, with all ambiguities being resolved against 
the insurer. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 142, 627 P.2d 317, 321 (1981); 
Ryan v. Mountain States Helicopter, Inc., 107 Idaho 150, 153, 686 P.2d 95, 98 
(Ct.App.1984). Where ambiguity exists, the court must construe the provisions consistently 
with what a reasonable person in the insured's position would have understood the policy 
language to mean. City of Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 51, 55, 878 P.2d 750, 754 
(1994); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho at 142, 627 P.2d at 321; Gordon v. Three 
Rivers Agency, Inc., 127 Idaho 539, 542, 903 P.2d 128, 131 (Idaho App., 1995). 
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The first step in the interpretation of the Policy at issue here is to determine whether 
there is an ambiguity in the Policy. Id. In their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment the 
Armstrongs argued alternatively that either the Policy provided coverage for their loss 
because the collapse of their swimming pool constituted a sudden and accidental discharge or 
overflow of water from within a household appliance, or that the Policy was ambiguous and 
the ambiguity should be resolved against Farmers because the Policy does not appear to 
define or limit the scope of what constitutes a "household appliance." 
When a contractual provision is reasonably subject to differing interpretations, it is 
ambiguous and its meaning becomes a question of fact. Moss v. Mid-America Fire and 
Marine Insurance Company, 103 Idaho 298, 300, 647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982). The te1m 
"household appliance" is not defined in the Policy even though nineteen other ordinary tenns 
are defined. Farmers as the drafter of the Policy had the opportunity to define the term 
"household appliance" and apparently chose not to. 
Farmers and the District Court contend that reading the undefined Policy term 
"household appliance" to include a swimming pool is imperrnissibly broad. However, that 
analysis begs the question: What would constitute a household appliance under the Policy? 
The Policy endorsement (H6104) purports to provide coverage for water damage" ... caused 
by a peril described under Section I ... Coverage C." That section, (Coverage C) at 
paragraph 13, describes the peril "Sudden and accidental discharge .. . of water .. . from 
within a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system or from within a household 
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appliance." Use of the disjunctive "OR" in that sentence of the Policy is significant because 
a household appliance would have to be something from which a sudden and accidental 
discharge of water could occur, other than a plumbing, heating or air conditioning system. 
Otherwise this provision of the Policy is illusory; it would cover nothing. Those items in and 
around a household from which water can escape suddenly and unexpectedly, and which are 
not connected to or part of the household plumbing, heating or air conditioning system are 
few and far between (hot water tank, bathtub/shower, sink, dishwasher, boiler, humidifier -
are all part of the aforementioned systems). A clothes washer would appear to be the only 
"appliance" that fits this description, at least according to Fanners' interpretation. Why then 
would the Policy not simply specify clothes washers as covered appliances instead of the 
more all-encompassing "household appliance?" 
An appliance is defined in common vernacular as "a device or instrument designed to 
perform a specific function." See, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE ( 4th ed. 2000). A pool is a device that provides for the specific function of 
aquatic exercise and recreation. The District Court seemed to place considerable emphasis 
on the notion that an appliance must be operated by electricity, R. p. 180, or be a 
"mechanical means to an end." Id. However, choosing these characteristics to define what is 
an appliance is simply adding to the Policy that which the drafters of the Policy (Farmers) 
did not see fit to include, and arguably proves the Armstrongs alternative position that the 
term "household appliance" is ambiguous, as used in the Policy. 
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Further, support for Armstongs' contention regarding the possibility of a swimming 
pool being a household appliance can be found in Idaho statute. Under Idaho's statutory 
Property Condition Disclosure Act, transferors of residential property are required to produce 
a Seller Property Disclosure Fonn. The form proposed in the statute contains the following 
language: 
4. All appliances and service systems included in the sale, (such as 
refrigerator/freezer, range/oven, dishwasher, disposal, hood/fan, central 
vacuum, microwave oven, trash compactor, smoke detectors, TV 
antenna/dish, fireplace/wood stove, water heater, garage door opener, 
pool/hot tub, etc.). [Emphasis addeaj 
See, J.C. §55-2508 
It therefore appears that Idaho's legislature has considered pools and hot tub to be 
included in the realm of appliances. If a pool/hot tub is an "appliance" for purposes of a real 
estate vendor's statutorily mandated disclosure, why would a pool not be an "appliance" for 
purposes of the Policy? Either the term "household appliance" includes a swimming pool or 
it is reasonably subject to such an interpretation and the Policy's use of that term, without 
further definition creates an ambiguity which must, as a matter of law, be construed against 
Farmers. In either case, the District Court's analysis was erroneous. 
The District Court erred when it decided an issue on summary judgment that 
was not raised by the Armstrongs and that the Armstrongs did not have notice of or 
opportunity to argue. 
The District Court erred in its decision that the Arrnstrongs' real and personal 
property losses were not covered under any other part of the Policy. See, Tr. pp. 4-5 (2007). 
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To reach this decision, the District Court myopically focused on the Policy's definitions 
which refer to "water damage" as including "overflow or escape of a body of water .... " R. 
p. 175. Effectively, what the District Court did was expand the scope of its analysis well 
beyond the argument presented by the Armstrongs' motion. In doing so, the Court not only 
declined to properly interpret the "household appliance" provision but also somehow 
concluded that the "body of water" language in the Policy should "trump" the household 
appliance provision. 
While it is within the court's purview to grant summary judgment to a non-moving 
party even if that party has not filed its own motion, the court cannot properly decide an issue 
.!!!!.! raised in the moving party's motion. See, Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677-78, 
39 P.3d 612, 617-18 (2001) (Summary judgment may be rendered for any party, not just the 
moving party ... However, the court may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party's 
motion for summary judgment.) The Armstrongs were the moving party. Their motion only 
asked the court to interpret a single provision in the Policy; the household appliance 
prov1s10n. However, the court did not limit its interpretation to that single provision but 
instead interpreted the entire Policy. 
The A1111strongs really only addressed one provision of the Policy in their Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. See, Mem. in Supp. of Pl.f's} Mot. for Partial Summ. J, R. pp. 
78-87. Even in their Reply to Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Partial Summary 
Judgment the Armstongs again attempted to purposefully focus the court on the narrow issue 
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of the household appliance provision. R. p. 145. During oral argument on the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, the Armstrongs limited their presentation to arguing for 
coverage under the household appliance provision. T R. pp. 6-7, ll. 22-6 (2005). 
Nevertheless, the District Court digressed into an analysis of the "body of water" clause in 
the Policy's definition section. 
Due to this, the Armstrongs were never able to adequately argue that the damage 
caused by their swimming pool failure did not meet the definition of water damage in the 
Policy and therefore is not excluded.6 In the Policy, water damage is defined in part as 
meaning "loss caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by ... a. Water from 
rain or snow, surface water, flood, waves, tidal water, overflow or escape of a body of water, 
or spray from any of these, whether or not driven by the wind." [underscore added]. The 
District Court opined that the water from the Armstrongs' swimming pool consisted of an 
"overflow or escape of a body of water." R. pp. 175-177. However, when you closely 
examine the full context of the portion of the "water damage" definition relied upon by the 
District Court, it becomes obvious that all of the types of water described in the context of 
this definition are naturally occurring. Rain is a naturally occurring event. Snow is a 
naturally occurring event. Surface and flood waters are naturally occmTing. Waves and tidal 
water are also naturally occurring. In this specific context "overflow or escape of a body of 
6 The Armstrongs attempted to address this issne briefly on oral argument only simply to point ont that the 
defendant's raised the issue because a swimming pool is listed in the definition as a source of "water below ground 
level ... which [can] seep[s] or leak[s] .... " Armstrongs then refocused the court on the relevant issue. T. R. p. 16, 
ll. 10-19. 
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water" reasonably refers to overflow or escape from natural bodies of water such as lakes, 
rivers, streams, and oceans. To stretch the context of this definition to include a swimming 
pool as a "body of water" is unreasonable and again adds a definitional element to the Policy 
that its drafters didn't see fit to include. The District Court should not re-write the contract 
of insurance, particularly not for the benefit of Fam1ers. 
The ordinary usage of the term "body of water" generally refers to a naturally 
occuning bodies. A body of water is "that part of the earth's surface covered with water 
(such as a river or lake or ocean); 'body of water'." WordNet® 3.0. Princeton University. 26 
Dec. 2007. Dictionary.com. In any event, this issue should have been allowed to be at least 
fully briefed and argued by both parties below. Summary judgment was not appropriate. 
Even though the District Court has flexibility to craft appropriate fonns of relief on a 
motion for smmnary judgment, the party against whom judgment is rendered must at least 
have notice that the court is considering the claim and be afforded an opportunity to defend 
against it. Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 811 P.2d 48, 52 (Ct. App. 1991). The 
language of the entire Policy and more specifically the "body of water" definition was not 
argued by the parties yet it was considered by the court and was apparently dispositive. 
If the Annstrongs had the opportunity to address coverage issues other than the 
household appliance provision raised in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 
AID1Strongs could, and would, have made several arguments for coverage not related to the 
household appliance provision. 
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For example, the Armstrongs are entitled to coverage for their losses on an oral binder 
or contract made by agent Nipp. This concept of coverage was provided for by the court in 
Foremost Insurance Company v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 143, 627 P.2d 317, 322 (1981). In 
Foremost the purchaser was not challenging the te1ms of the written policy as being 
ambiguous but was relying on the fact he was told by his agent, "that he was covered." Id. 
The purchaser, Guanche, paid $300.00 to an insurance agent in return for coverage. The 
. . 
$300.00 was accepted and the agent told Guanche he was covered. Guanche was never 
provided with any policy form. Foremost, 102 Idaho at 140, 627 P.2d at 319. Guanche 
intended to insure his property against loss caused by theft, the elements or other calamity. 
Id. The issue before the court was whether Guanche had any insurance coverage. Foremost, 
102 Idaho at 141, 627 P.2d at 320. The Foremost court found guidance from Toevs v. 
Western Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., 94 Idaho 151, 483 P.2d 682 (1971). Foremost, 
102 Idaho at 143, 627 P.2d at 322. In Toevs the plaintiff paid the initial premium on a life 
insurance policy but died prior to having the required physical examination. His widow 
testified that she expected that the insurance coverage was effective immediately. Id. "(T)he 
fact that the agent did not tell the purchaser that he would not be covered until he had 
undergone the physical exam was one of the factors considered by the Court in holding that 
the insured was covered in spite of the provision in the policy to the contrary." Id. In 
Foremost, just as in Toevs, the agent did not tell the purchaser of any limitations in his 
coverage. Id. The Foremost Court concluded that "in regard to an oral contract of insurance, 
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'(i)finsurers desire to incorporate the provisions of their usual policies that are in derogation 
of the rights of the insured, such provisions must be specifically brought to the attention of 
the person seeking insurance at the time of the oral agreement.' It is the duty of the insurer 
to inform the insured of what he is obtaining; it is not the duty of the insured to seek out 
exclusions and limitations not revealed to him." Id. 
In this case, just as in Foremost and Toevs, there. was evidence before the District 
Court that the Armstrongs discussed coverage with their agent. The A1mstrongs even 
specifically asked about coverage related to their swimn:ring pool. The Armstrongs then paid 
their premium and reasonably believed they were covered. Nipp never brought all the 
various exclusions (nor exceptions to the exclusions) contained in the Policy concerning 
water damage to the attention of the Armstrongs. It was not the duty of the Armstrongs to 
seek out the exclusions and lin:ritations not revealed to them. The Armstrongs should be 
covered on the oral agreement for coverage. Summary Judgment should not have been 
granted against them on the issue of coverage. At the very least there is an issue of fact as to 
whether an oral agreement was made. Summary Judgment against the Anustrongs was not 
appropriate. 
Last, the Armstrongs could argue for coverage provided by an exception to an 
exclusion in the Policy. SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED, item number 4, has an 
exclusion for "Faulty. inadequate or defective ... design ... workmanship, construction, or 
maintenance of part or al/ of any property (including land, structures. or any improvements) 
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whether on or off the residence premises", but has an exception within the exclusion which 
states: "However, we do cover loss by fire, explosion or sudden and accidental discharge of 
water." R. pp. 26-42, as Augmented/Corrected. [underscore added] This provision of the 
Policy appears to exclude coverage for defective construction of an improvement to the 
property except where the defect causes the accidental discharge of water. It pertains not just 
to the dwelling construction, but also to "any improvements" on the insured premises. The 
Annstrongs swimming pool was clearly an improvement on the premises. It was also like 
faulty, inadequate or defective in its design, workmanship, construction or maintenance; 
otherwise it would not have collapsed as it did. It is undisputed that what occurred in this 
case was an accidental discharge of water. This portion of the Policy however does not have 
any apparent limitation on what the source of that ( accidentally discharged) water could be 
(i.e. - no mention of plumbing, heating, air conditioning systems or household appliances). 
This provision of the Policy covers the Dwelling, Separate Str·uctures and Personal Property. 
Again Summary Judgment against coverage for the Armstrongs was inappropriate. 
Attorney fees. 
When attorney fees are requested by a party in its issues on appeal, the issue must 
also be addressed in the argument portion of the brief or it will not be considered by the 
court. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 768, 992 P.2d 751, 763 
(1999). 
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The Annstrongs' underlying action, and in tum this Appeal, are brought under Idaho 
Code§ 41-1839 which provides for attorneys fees in actions by insureds to compel coverage 
under policies of insurance. The Armstrongs should not be required to bear the financial 
burden of litigation costs to secure coverage for which they already paid a policy premium to 
Fanners. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in its ruling on the Arrnstrongs' Motion for Partial Sununary 
Judgment. The District Court also erred in its ruling on the issue of total coverage provided 
because that issue was not properly before the Court. The District Court's Memorandum 
Opinion and Orders should be vacated and the case remanded for fmiher proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of January, 2008. 
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